I. INTRODUCTION
In the February issue of The Business Lawyer , 1 Paul Graf broke into the halting conversation about offi cer liability. He argued, in essence, that Lyman Johnson and others have advanced an analysis of corporate offi cers that, while perhaps theoretically sound, "departs from reality."
2 We welcome Mr. Graf' s voice in the still-unfolding development of this area of law. But in this article we argue that, for a number of reasons, it is Mr. Graf' s views that are unrealistic in today' s world of corporate life and corporate law. Adoption of his position, which we understand is echoed by many in the corporate community, would lead corporate law astray, and would serve to weaken the role of fi duciary duties both in guiding offi cers and sanctioning their misconduct.
Part II of this article highlights the sharply distinct roles of directors and offi cers in our system of corporate governance-i.e., directing versus managing. This foundational difference invites the question of whether such disparate roles should, nonetheless, result in equivalent fi duciary duties, as Mr. Graf asserts. Part III contends that the divergent functions of directors and offi cers should matter for fi duciary duty analysis. Corporate offi cers, unlike directors, are agents of the corporation, and therefore agency law supplies the default duties for offi cers, subject to possible judicial or contractual modifi cation.
Part IV argues that directors, not courts, likely will resolve the vast majority of disputes concerning offi cer breaches of duty. Consequently, there will be no great outbreak of litigation ex post and courts will continue, as now, to address far more director than offi cer cases. Moreover, for a variety of reasons we identify, a stricter standard of care for offi cers than for directors will not distort or have adverse effects on managerial behavior. Part V sketches the important but oft-neglected role that meaningful offi cer fi duciary duties can play in shaping offi cer conduct ex ante. Part VI explains how Mr. Graf collapses many established distinctions in current corporate law analysis, and shows how he offers less a critique of offi cer liability than an unwarranted broadside against judicial review of fi duciary duties more generally. Part VII concludes by describing how the federal government-notably the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")-is now the chief legal regulator of offi cers, not Delaware courts or state corporate law. Necessarily, with widespread offi cer wrongdoing in contemporary business society showing no sign of abating, some legal body must articulate and enforce legal rules for offi cers. The question for members of the Delaware legal community is whether they will contribute to this enterprise or quit the fi eld. 
II. THE UNDENIABLY DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
demics fail to appreciate the myriad substantive differences between the roles of corporate offi cers and directors, and instead lump offi cers and directors together as "management" for purposes of analyzing fi duciary duty obligations. 4 This confl ation is problematic. A realistic analysis of the fi duciary duty obligations of offi cers as compared to the well-established fi duciary duty obligations of directors requires that we fi rst acknowledge the very different governance roles of offi cers as compared to directors.
A. DIRECTING VERSUS MANAGING
Since it is not practical, or even possible, for the shareholders of a corporation with widely dispersed ownership to oversee the management of the business, the board of directors serves as an "intermediary" between the business owners (the shareholders) and the business managers (the offi cers). 5 Boards of directors ensure that shareholder wealth is enhanced through providing guidance on business strategy and through oversight and monitoring of the offi cers in their management of the business. 6 Mr. Graf overlooks this intermediary role of the board, assuming instead that boards of directors actively manage the business. 7 While corporate statutes provide directors with management authority, 8 in reality, given the "size and complexity of many modern corporations," 9 boards of directors cannot and do not "manage" the business and affairs of the corporation. 10 Instead, the "norm in corporate America" is that the board delegates its management authority to the offi cers. 6. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02(a) & cmt. d; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 1. 7. Graf, supra note 1, at 319, 324-25 ("directors have primary responsibility for managing the corporation"); see also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("the business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors"); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2011) ("the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors"). 10. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02 cmt. a; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 2 ("The key challenge for directors is to oversee the corporation' s activities and strategy by utilizing effective oversight processes and making informed decisions, without becoming day-to-day managers."); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) & cmt., at 8-4 ("In some closely held corporations, the board of directors may be involved in the day-to-day business . . . . But in many other corporations, the business and affairs are managed 'under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of' the board of directors, since operational management is delegated to executive offi cers and other professional managers.").
11. In delegating its management authority, directors adopt corporate bylaws and approve initial board resolutions granting the offi cers vast and wide-reaching operational powers.
12 Mr. Graf' s assertion that "the board controls the level of specifi city of each delegation" is simply inaccurate. 13 In reality, directors only intervene or limit offi cer discretion on major corporate decisions, such as: change of control or fi nancing transactions; acquisitions and dispositions of material assets; major changes in plans and strategies; and changes involving accounting, fi nancial statements, and internal controls and procedures.
14 Since the board only intervenes in management functions for major issues, the directors focus their attention on board oversight and monitoring functions. 15 The directors oversee and monitor fi nancial performance, offi cer managerial performance, compliance with legal obligations and corporate policies, and evaluation and design of appropriate risk management structures. 16 Perhaps the most important director oversight functions include the selection and appointment of qualifi ed individuals to serve as the corporate offi cers, followed by the periodic evaluation of those offi cers and the determination of executive compensation.
17
With directors intervening only on major issues, the offi cers are left with primary responsibility to manage the day-to-day operations of the business. Using the broad delegation of authority from the board, executive offi cers " Company bylaws, which granted the CEO, subject to the power and authority of the board, "general supervision, direction and control of the offi cers, employees, business and affairs of the Corporation." Massey Energy Co., Restated Bylaws (Exhibit 3.2, Form 8-K), Article IV, § 4.01 (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37748/000119312510275690/dex32.htm.
13. Graf, supra note 1, at 319. On the other hand, Mr. Graf also raises a concern that "[i]f directors divest themselves of responsibility by delegating substantial discretion to offi cers without meaningful guidance, and then neglect to monitor the exercise of that discretion, should directors not be held accountable at least to the same extent as offi cers? To do otherwise is to grant directors a license to shirk responsibility with impunity." Id. at 320. We disagree with this concern; the director monitoring function is subject to well-established fi duciary duty obligations, and the standard of liability for offi cers in carrying out their management functions should not change those standards.
14. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 11; Vo, supra note 11, at 68 n. Offi cers and directors are further distinguished by their very different time commitments to the business, level of access to corporate information, and compensation. These differences refl ect the divergent roles played by directors and offi cers in corporate governance.
Time Commitment
While Mr. Graf is correct that current expectations for director engagement and preparation are far greater than in the recent past, 24 directors still spend only a small fraction of the amount of time that offi cers spend in fulfi lling their respon- 19. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.41 cmt., at 8-64. 20. For an illustration of offi cers devising major business strategies without the involvement of the board of directors, consider how after executives at Goldman Sachs realized that the company' s "$6 billion bet on American home loans" was a potential disaster in the making, the chief fi nancial offi cer and three subordinate executives developed a seven-point strategy for unloading the bad debt and making a hefty profi t in the process. The executives turned Goldman' s $6 billion long position into a $10 billion short position without any involvement of the company' s board of directors. 27 and the fi gure has hovered at around twenty hours per month through at least 2009. 28 Even under a conservative estimate that offi cers spend fi fty hours per week on the job, 29 that would be 200 hours per month, which means that offi cers spend around ten times the amount of time that directors spend in fulfi lling their duties to the corporation.
30
Serving as a director is "not a hobby," but it is important to remember that most directors also hold demanding full-time jobs and serve on multiple boards of directors. 31 As an illustration, of the six non-management directors at Google, fi ve hold top-level executive positions at other entities, and the sixth is a director at four other large companies. 
Compensation
Mr. Graf argues that non-management directors are "well compensated," citing that "in 2009, non-management directors at General Electric Company ('GE') received average annual compensation of just over $356,000; more than half of that average sum [ representing the company (or board) at events, and 13.5 hours engaged in other activities related to board service. These averages are not cumulative, but add up to slightly more than 210 hours per year, so the 20-hour-per-month estimate from the What Directors Think survey may be high.).
29. We believe offi cers likely spend more than fi fty hours per week on the job, but we use fi fty hours as an estimate since empirical research on the matter is limited. However the O*Net Chief Executive Report, supra note 18, reports that over 90 percent of offi cers work more than forty hours per week. For purposes of these fi ndings, the offi cers include those with the titles listed in note 18.
30. See supra note 28 (directors spend twenty hours per month, about fi ve hours per week, fulfi lling their board duties). We think our estimates understate the differential but we are seeking to make a conservative comparison.
31. Graf, supra note 1, at 325; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLC, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY: THE 2010 RESULTS (2010), at 31-32, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-gover nance/assets/annual-corporate-directors-survey-2010.pdf. 33. Graf, supra note 1, at 333-34.
is that in 2010, the GE executive offi cers received average total compensation of about $15.2 million each, or over fi fty times the compensation of the directors.
34
This 50 to 1 ratio was generally consistent across the board for large public companies in 2010.
35
Perhaps even more important in determining whether compensation provides similar incentives for directors and offi cers, consider that more than half of the directors at GE serve, or have served, as chief executives of Fortune 500 companies. 36 Put simply, serving on corporate boards is not how many directors earn their bread. Further to this point, consider that in 2010, average compensation for the GE named executive offi cers increased by 12.5 percent, 37 but average compensation for the non-management directors at GE dropped by 20 percent. 
Access to Information
Corporate offi cers are unquestionably better positioned to gain access to corporate information than members of the board of directors. Consider the access to company information enjoyed by the offi cers at Google. The key managers of Google' s different business divisions meet in a conference room several afternoons each week to work as if in a "war room situation."
39 These offi cers discuss business strategies and raise different issues and ideas that may come up during a regular business day. 40 In contrast, the Google board of directors held seven meetings and acted by written consent four times in 2010. 41 The Google offi cers likely spend more time together in a month than the directors spend together all year.
While conceding that directors are not in as frequent contact with corporate information, Mr. Graf counters that directors can "demand access to any information that they may deem necessary to fulfi ll their managing and monitoring duties."
42 However, the ability to demand information cannot put the directors in the same position as offi cers. Any information provided to directors is either created by the offi cers or produced under the direction of the offi cers. 43 Further, directors often cannot dedicate the same amount of time as the offi cers to reviewing or following up on this information, and even if they did, offi cers have "fi rm-specifi c familiarity with the details of the particular companies they manage," which makes the information much more meaningful to those offi cers. 44 State corporate statutes recognize the informational gap between the offi cers and directors, and thus protect directors from personal liability for actions taken in reliance on information provided by offi cers. 45 Renowned Delaware lawyer R. Franklin Balotti and Megan W. Shaner argue that "[b]ecause directors are entitled to such protection, offi cers should arguably be held to a strict standard of care and requirement to be fully informed." 46 This statutory treatment allowing directors to rely on information from the offi cers refl ects that offi cers have much greater access to and understanding of corporate information, and also is a testament to the different roles and functions of the offi cers as compared to the directors.
C. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF OFFICERS
Overlooking the stark differences noted above, Mr. Graf fails to acknowledge the reality that corporate offi cers, not directors, occupy the central role in corporate governance. Of the three main actors in corporate governance (shareholders, directors, and offi cers), the offi cers clearly continue to reign supreme. 47 Shareholders are more likely to sell their shares than try to effect corporate change, 48 48. Id. at 51 n.153 ("Our vast and highly liquid fi nancial markets enable large institutional shareholders to sell their shares when they perceive inadequacies of corporate governance, rather than An illustration of this central role of the offi cer is found amidst the global furor prompted by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Following the spill, Tony Hayward, then chief executive of BP, was dubbed America' s "most hated" and "clueless" man, 50 and was under such intense pressure from the media and general public that he was forced to resign. 51 The BP board members, by contrast, including the chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg, were spared such treatment and retained their board seats.
Similarly, consider how offi cers were at the heart of the economic scandals in the early 2000s and more recently with the global fi nancial crisis. 52 Or consider how successful chief executives like Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg are under the constant glare of the media spotlight. Offi cers, not directors, occupy center stage because offi cer performance is crucial to the success or failure of the companies these offi cers run and to the economy as a whole. 53 Mr. Graf ignores this central role of the offi cer, going so far as to argue that enforcing offi cer fi duciary duties would be inappropriate because it would be diffi cult to defi ne who the "offi cers" are for purposes of fi duciary duty liability. 54 Curiously, in two pages of discussion about how diffi cult it would be to defi ne whether someone is an "offi cer," 55 Mr. Graf fails to mention that Delaware' s long-arm statute provides an explicit defi nition of the term for purposes of taking jurisdiction over such offi cers in the Delaware courts. 56 The Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") and the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") also provide fi x them. This has placed de facto control in the hands of the chief executive offi cer." ( he word 'offi cer' means an offi cer of the corporation who (i) is or was the president, chief executive offi cer, chief operating offi cer, chief fi nancial offi cer, chief legal offi cer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting offi cer of the corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful, (ii) is or was identifi ed in the corporation' s public fi lings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission because such person is or was [one] of the most highly compensated executive offi cers of the corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful, or (iii) has, by written agreement with the corporation, consented to be identifi ed as an offi cer for purposes of this section. that corporations may have such "offi cers" as are named in the bylaws or approved by the board of directors in accordance with those bylaws. 57 Clearly, holding one of these enumerated offi cer positions will subject an individual to personal jurisdiction in state courts. Determination of who is an "offi cer" in a particular public corporation should not be diffi cult, given this authoritative guidance.
III. MODELING THE OFFICER'S ROLE: AGENCY THEORY AS REALITY
We believe that the divergent roles played by directors and offi cers in corporate governance should matter for fi duciary duty analysis. We believe too that agency law principles serve to illuminate further the differences while also supplying the default rules for offi cer duties.
Mr. Directors, in other words, oversee the interests of the corporation, an organization that is a legal but artifi cial entity unable by itself to advance and protect its own interests. Acting on behalf of the corporations they serve 65 -not their own behalf-directors do for those companies exactly what many individual persons do: employ agents. Chief among those persons so engaged by a corporation are executive offi cers. When they act for the corporation, such offi cers clearly are agents of the corporate principal, deployed as such by the directors, who themselves represent the inanimate corporation' s interests. In this way, we see yet again the quite different functions and corresponding legal statuses of 65. Graf believes this straightforward arrangement, standard in business organizations, presents a "theoretical quagmire." Graf, supra note 1, at 327. Keeping in mind that, under modern corporate statutes and business necessity, directors of public companies oversee but do not manage the business and affairs of the corporation, the relationship of directors and offi cers, in practice and theory, is quite clear. Directors act on behalf of the company (the principal) to hire offi cers who become managing agents of the company, not agents of the directors. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1648-49. Equating directors and offi cers as "managers" muddies the governance relationship.
directors and offi cers in corporate governance. Directors are not, but offi cers are, agents.
Agency law therefore provides a pre-existing set of expectations and principles that, unlike the case with directors, does not require "starting from scratch" in modeling the offi cer' s role in corporate governance. Moreover, an agency relationship is inherently fi duciary in character and it is consensual, but contrary to Mr. Graf' s assertion, 66 it can arise independently of contract. 67 Given the agency status of executive offi cers, the key question is whether a core feature of agency lawfi duciary duties-also will be adopted by corporate law or, instead, will be modifi ed in some fashion to achieve particular policy goals. We make several brief points here in this regard and refer the reader to other scholarship for fuller treatment. 68 First, since executive offi cers undoubtedly are agents, the default and baseline standard for the fi duciary duties they owe should be drawn from agency law, 69 the body of law traditionally governing that subject. Those who fi nd this objectionable, for whatever reason, must make a compelling case as to why these standard default rules, including the generally applicable standard of "normal" or ordinary care, 70 do not apply to offi cers. Of course, a key element of making such a case is to state convincingly why the quite different functions of offi cers and directors in corporate governance-sketched in Part II above-are of no signifi cance on the fi duciary duty issue. We think it is incumbent on Mr. Graf and others to demonstrate persuasively why, when it comes to default fi duciary duties, offi cers uniquely are not "exactly like other agents." 71 Second, there is no obvious reason why an organizational principal, such as a corporation, should expect or be entitled to a lower standard of care (or other duties) from its agents than that expected by individual principals, whose expectations clearly are provided by the precepts of agency law. 72 If anything, the monitoring of agents by an organizational principal is more challenging than monitoring by an individual principal and, on that ground, a stricter not looser standard should be owed. Third, doubts about equating directors and offi cers for personal liability purposes have long existed in Delaware, dating back at least to the legislative decision not to include offi cers within the exculpation coverage of section 66. Graf, supra note 1, at 328 ("agency is a contractual relationship" ("Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances. Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the agent acted with due care and diligence. If an agent claims to possess special skills or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge.").
71. Graf, supra note 1, at 326. 72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
102(b)(7), as was done for directors. 73 This refl ects an acknowledged difference between the responsibilities of offi cers and directors that has endured for twentyfi ve years. Although in 2009 the Delaware Supreme Court equated director and offi cer duties in general terms, 74 it did not resolve a host of other issues pertaining to corporate offi cers, including the precise standard of care for offi cers. 75 Finally, as the corporate law community grapples with the emerging law of corporate offi cers, we should be careful not to apply automatically concerns about overly strict director liability standards to offi cers. The modern director care standard has settled at the gross negligence level, 76 and in Delaware directors can be exculpated from personal liability for breaching the duty of care.
77 These movements toward greater personal protection for directors were grounded in real, if still debatable, concerns about a rash of costly litigation and a perceived unwillingness of many persons to serve on corporate boards or take appropriate business risks without enhanced immunity. But do these concerns demonstrably apply to offi cers? Will we see an upsurge in litigation against offi cers, an unwillingness to occupy the executive suite, and other adverse effects if offi cers are held to the customary standard of care for all other agents, which is only somewhat stricter than that for directors? The next part argues that such an outcome is highly unlikely.
IV. DIRECTORS, NOT COURTS, ADDRESS MOST OFFICER WRONGDOING; UNLIKELY ADVERSE EFFECTS OF OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY
Corporate directors, owing fi duciary duties of care and loyalty, face the prospect of being sued by shareholders, either directly or derivatively, for breaching their duties. 78 Of course, to initiate a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation itself, shareholders must plead that a demand on the board to begin litigation would [W]hether and how the business judgment rule applies to offi cers in Delaware remains unclear. Moreover, the court in Gantler addressed the duty of loyalty issue, not the duty of care issue. Also, the case did not involve offi cer oversight responsibilities. Thus, we continue to lack clear guidance as to the scope and reach of offi cer duties of care and good faith. Relatedly, the Delaware Supreme Court also did not address the ordinary negligence versus gross negligence standard in the care context, as the issue was not before it. Finally, given rather signifi cant differences in the roles and responsibilities of directors and offi cers within corporate governance, the court did not explain the reason for equating their fi duciary duties. Clearly the area of offi cer duties remains murkier than that of director duties.
Id.
76 be futile. 79 Even if a derivative claim is rightly commenced without a pre-suit demand, a properly functioning special committee can move to dismiss the claim if the committee believes doing so is in the best interests of the corporation. 80 At the root of the law and practice of derivative litigation is the recognition that the claim is an asset of the corporation itself and, therefore, it is presumptively subject to control by the board or a board committee.
With respect to claims of wrongdoing by offi cers this is even more obviously the case. If offi cers are conceived of as agents of the corporation, their misconduct wrongs the company and creates a legal claim belonging to the corporation, just as, conversely, their conduct as agents toward third parties can create liability for the corporation. 81 Even those persons who reject an agency conception of offi cers, however, would have to agree that offi cer conduct damaging to the company itself creates a corporate derivative claim, not a direct claim. 82 Thus, indisputably, the board of directors, not stockholders, would be the appropriate body for addressing such claims. The exception would be those claims that are pursued in bankruptcy court where the trustee in bankruptcy would exercise control over claims against offi cers, but even those actions would be assets of the corporate estate.
With boards of directors controlling most claims against offi cers, we think there will be relatively few lawsuits initiated by directors against offi cers. We expect that most offi cer misconduct coming to the attention of the board will be resolved as part of an intra-corporate sanction, whether that sanction be discharge, reprimand, compensation adjustment, demotion, or delayed promotion. 83 Those offi cers who leave employment frequently receive severance payments, 84 and those exit packages likely also entail the mutual release of all claims. Directors, more- 82. We do not rule out the possibility that certain kinds of claims against offi cers might be characterized as direct claims. Briefl y, we make a few points on a subject that warrants more attention. First, claims against an executive who also serves on the board of directors must differentiate wrongdoing as an offi cer from wrongdoing in director capacity. Second, direct claims against offi cers are most likely to arise in signifi cant transactions such as mergers and acquisitions where a senior offi cer is attending, by delegation, to what is ultimately a board-level function that bears directly on a shareholder' s interest as a shareholder. Third, permitting direct suits against offi cers is not inconsistent with an agency theory of offi cers. Rather, such claims involve those actions by offi cers, acting on behalf of corporations, which directly bear on the interest of a shareholder as a shareholder. Of course, both direct and derivative claims can arise from a single transaction. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996). With respect to public corporations at least, we expect that the vast majority of claims against offi cers will be derivative in nature.
83. For some reason, Graf states that Professor Johnson "bypasses the reality that offi cers face immediate expulsion by the board for reckless conduct." Graf, supra note 1, at 333. Yet Graf' s own footnote 99 quotes from scholarship by Professor Johnson that recognizes that the board may pursue "an intra-fi rm sanction." Id. at 337 n.99. Moreover, Johnson and Mark Sides, writing in 2004, stated that "boards may negotiate settlements with offi cers as part of an intra-corporate sanction, whether that be discharge, reprimand, compensation adjustment, demotion, or delayed promotion. over, are in a position to negotiate a tougher exit arrangement if they invoke offi cer breaches of duty as leverage in departure discussions. Such breaches of duty, of course, operate independently of employment contracts. Too often, directors and their counsel may narrowly focus only on the terms of an offi cer' s employment agreement, forgetting that fi duciary duties transcend such agreements. Whether used as a negotiating lever or not, fi duciary duty claims against executives likely are "settled up" at the departure stage and therefore will not be litigated. This probably refl ects the pattern followed by most disappointed principals, the majority of whom likely discharge, rather than sue, wrongdoing agents. Consequently, judges will rarely have to make the determination as to whether an offi cer did or did not behave negligently. And in those infrequent cases that are pressed, judges will understand that the directors (or bankruptcy trustee) believe these cases to be of special importance to the corporation' s best interests.
Appreciating the institutional reality of how (and where) most claims against corporate offi cers will be handled helps us see that the examples posed by Mr. Graf on the top of page 322 of his article are not as diffi cult to resolve as he believes. 85 We think that all of Mr. Graf' s examples do reveal inexcusable carelessness, especially the third and fourth instances. One should not be "unduly swayed" in introducing a new product when "additional research" would reveal fl aws, and "neglecting" a criminal background check when hiring for a position of trust is unacceptably careless. But people in organizations face those and countless other situations and challenges every day, and many of us make mistakes. Mistakes rarely lead to discharge, however, or even to other lesser sanctions. This is not because offi cers should be under any illusion, as Mr. Graf contends, 86 that they do not face monetary damages for negligence, but for at least three other reasons.
First, it is ineffi cient for any principal to try to detect/prevent all carelessness or wrongdoing and to pursue legal claims for all such behavior. Much behavior that is below standard simply and sensibly goes by the board, either because it is a fi nancial package). Increasingly, executives negotiate severance agreements long before actual departure. A recent study found that in 2007 more than 55 percent of S&P 500 fi rms had awarded top executives severance contracts as part of their overall compensation package. Peggy Huang, Marital Prenups? A Look at CEO Severance Agreements 1 (Mar. 15, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786540 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink). The study found that the median CEO severance payment averaged about $7 million. Id. Professor Huang also found that fi rms with such severance arrangements experienced signifi cant underperformance in their future stock returns. Id. at 4. Use of cash rather than equity as the form of payment worsened the performance. Id. For purposes of our work, Professor Huang further found that cash payment severance contracts induce CEOs to take excess risks-the payments essentially representing "put" options-while equity element severance contracts signifi cantly lessen excess risk-taking behavior. Id. at 5. The point is that executive compensation appears to infl uence executive behavior, from a risk standpoint.
85. See Graf, supra note 1, at 322. 86. Id. ("Offi cers believe the maximum penalty for neglectful conduct in fulfi lling job responsibilities is disciplinary action or expulsion, not monetary damages."). This lack of knowledge on the part of offi cers-if true-is one reason why legal counsel should regularly advise offi cers of their fi duciary duties. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 152-56 (offering succinct model advice designed for this purpose). Limited empirical work suggests that both inside and outside legal counsel do not routinely advise offi cers about their duties. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 669-78; Johnson & Garvis, supra note 3, at 1119-20. undetected or because it is deliberately left unsanctioned. Second, the standard is reasonable conduct, not perfect conduct, even under a negligence standard. Mr. Graf repeatedly and wrongly sets up a straw man in stating that offi cers should not have to have "all" information before they act 87 -no one says they do. They, like directors, 88 need only have the information that is "reasonably available," although as noted in Part II, it is reasonable to expect that offi cers will have access to more information than directors. Both boards and courts should take account of imperfect information, time pressures, the signifi cance of a matter, and a range of factors pertinent to the particular circumstances faced by the offi cer in a specifi c position. A review of the pertinent legal standard for agents reveals, not surprisingly, that an agent is expected to act only with the care, competence, and diligence "normally exercised" by similar agents in "similar circumstances." 89 This, as always with fi duciary duty analysis, is a context and position-sensitive measure. An offi cer therefore will be held only to the normal "community" standard for such an offi cer. Moreover, the range of relevant considerations for offi cers, being more complex than for directors, who act only episodically, likely will lead to a fair bit of running room for offi cers under such a "normally exercised" standard. It is true, as Mr. Graf rightly contends, 90 that making negligence determinations can be challenging for a court, but by no means is that unique to the corporate setting. Nor is it a reason to give offi cers a lifetime free pass for such behavior, unlike other agents or negligent wrongdoers.
Third, as to the substance or merits of the business decision made, the substantive protection of the business judgment rule should be fully available to offi cers. 91 We merely (but importantly) contend that the duty of care for offi cers should be the ordinary and "normally exercised" care standard, not the looser gross negligence standard applicable to directors. We have not ever argued for depriving offi cers of the substantive protections of the business judgment rule for an offi cer' s business decisions, only that the rule' s protection should not sweep as broadly for offi cers as for directors on the duty of care aspect.
We recognize that, although offi cers are agents, their position and centrality in corporate governance distinguishes them from other agents in certain ways that, if anything, should reinforce deference to their substantive judgments. First, given their vast discretion and the very broad delegation of power from the board, executive offi cers infrequently are constrained by the "duty of obedience" that may more typically rein in an agent operating under closer supervision by a principal. 92 Lawyers and real estate agents, for example, however much professional latitude they have as to how they perform, typically have a client providing instructions as to what should be accomplished. Second, and relatedly, the board of directors acting for the company, unlike other principals, typically communicates corporate goals in a very broad manner, perhaps expressing them in such metrics as profi tability, market share, and growth. What course of action or strategies to be taken to achieve those goals is largely up to senior management, however. This means discretion over the substance of business decisions lies primarily with the agent, not the principal. There is little basis for holding someone liable for a substantive decision that deliberately was left to them to make in the fi rst place. Third, executive offi cers operate in all industries. Unlike agents operating in particular industries, again such as lawyers (whatever their fi eld) and real estate agents, where norms as to particular advisable substantive actions may develop, it would seem extraordinarily diffi cult, and contrary to the dynamic nature of business, to expect the same for managers. Consequently, the duty of care for offi cers must essentially be a process-oriented duty, though we emphasize again that the standard of "normally exercised" care means that courts can be expected to look to prevailing practices for guidance.
We also think that two additional points should be made as to possible effects of a stricter liability standard for offi cers than directors. First, Mr. Graf speculates that holding offi cers to the conventional agency standard of care would lead them to engage in a variety of dysfunctional behavior. 93 He conjectures that offi cers would seek to defl ect responsibility, engage in scapegoating, and play it safe.
94 Whether this is true or not ultimately is an empirical question. We continue to think, however, that those concerns are implausible and a bit far-fetched. Offi cers do not climb the corporate ladder in a healthy business by engaging in such behavior. Successful executive offi cers, moreover, tend to be confi dent, determined, creative risk-takers who likely would not "play it safe," if only because that conduct leads to obscurity and fewer rewards such as higher pay, promotion, and career mobility. And being careful, we emphasize, is not the same as not taking business risks. One can follow a sensible decision-making approach prior to undertaking ventures that carry quite signifi cant business risk. Furthermore, by Mr. Graf ' s own reckoning, 95 liability concerns are not demonstrable motivators in the executive suite. If anything, perhaps a bit more executive concern and lawyerly advice about liability would curb improper conduct. 96 Our legal system' s typical response to unacceptable behavior is to clamp down on it, not contend that the very effort of doing so might lead to post hoc fi nger-pointing by wrongdoers. The extent of scapegoating after the fact of wrongdoing, moreover, would seem to have little relationship to the standard of conduct applicable to a wrongdoer; intentional and reckless actors can likely "scapegoat" as well as others. And if dysfunctional behavior were repeatedly engaged in, as Mr. Graf fears, the offi cer' s superior offi cer, or the board itself, should act. This is precisely where high-functioning directors are so essential. recurrent scapegoating or any other conduct not geared toward innovative business growth and profi t enhancement; conduct inimical to attaining those goals likely would be ordered to stop or the offi cer rightly threatened with discharge.
Second, Mr. Graf contends that holding offi cers to the customary agency standard of care would result in "uninsulated exposure to unlimited liability." 97 We doubt this as well. As noted above, we believe relatively few cases would even go to litigation. Moreover, all other agents in this country operate under such a standard and we do not observe a widespread outcry over agency law' s longstanding adoption of "unlimited" liability. And offi cers, where appropriate, would enjoy the usual protections of indemnifi cation, advancement of expenses, D&O insurance, and, possibly, negotiated modifi cations of the care standard, about which we say more below. But it is important to corporate law and society that offi cers faceand know ex ante that they face-the prospect of judgment and the accountability and shame that accompanies signifi cant misuse of power, even if monetary liability is reimbursed in some way.
In short, we are highly doubtful that a stricter (but conventional) standard of care for full-time offi cers than for part-time directors will lead to very much litigation, widespread liability, or dysfunctional conduct by offi cers. It may, however, serve a useful ex ante function if it is properly communicated.
V. THE EX ANTE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Recent empirical work suggests that lawyers do a better job of advising directors about fi duciary duties than in advising offi cers. 98 Certainly the usual focus on fi duciary duties is to emphasize their role as an ex post sanctioning and risk allocation device in litigation. This aspect receives the most attention and commentary, though an offi cer-specifi c focus is sorely lacking in traditional corporate law materials. We know far less about the role of fi duciary duties in shaping or altering director or offi cer conduct beforehand. It might be very informative to study both directors and senior management to learn what they actually know about fi duciary duties-as opposed to what lawyers say they tell their clientsand, somewhat more challenging, to determine how their understanding does or does not factor into their decision making.
We have developed elsewhere the reasons why providing an a priori understanding of fi duciary duties by offi cers is advisable.
99 Among these reasons are to inform offi cers that their behavior must adhere to legal standards separate and apart from what is set forth in their employment agreements, and that failure to adhere to those standards can result in sanctions, whether imposed in court or via the intra-corporate sanctions noted earlier. 100 Here, it suffi ces to say, in response to Mr. Graf, that fi duciary duties are not simply liability rules to be invoked ex post in litigation. The duties of care and loyalty are affi rmative, overarching standards , broadly phrased as such to serve the salutary purpose of reminding executive offi cers that in all their endeavors the primary focus is not to be their own selfinterest or goals, but the best interests of the company. This may or may not alter behavior-empirically, we do not know-but it seems hard to believe that companies and their stockholders would be worse off if senior managers were regularly reminded by counsel that they should comply with the legal and social norms of loyalty and care and competence, which is what, reduced to their essence, such duties demand.
VI. MISUNDERSTANDING CURRENT DUTIES
Much of Mr. Graf' s article reads less like an argument against meaningful offi cer liability than a larger rejection of serious judicial review of fi duciary misconduct more generally. Moreover, Mr. Graf seems rather fundamentally to misunderstand what role the duty of care plays in corporate law, and he seeks to radically alter established analysis of that duty.
Current decisional law in Delaware is clear that, for directors at least, the duty of "care in the decision-making context is process due care only." 101 There is no "substance" to a court' s review of due care.
102 Mr. Graf would jettison this bedrock tenet, stating: "Judicial restraint in reviewing substantive decisions should apply equally to process decisions as to substantive decisions."
103 And: "Judges should limit the scope of their review of corporate decision making, whether of the ultimate decision or the process used to arrive at that decision." 104 The reason for doing so, according to Mr. Graf, is that all judicial review suffers from hindsight bias and "rationality is in the eye of the beholder."
105 He posits, without support, that the line between process failures and substantive business decisions makes only theoretical, not practical, sense. 106 In place of existing duty of care doctrine, he believes that only reckless or intentional misconduct should be actionable, and then, based on the duty of loyalty. 107 And, in the name of "clarity," "the duty of care should be subsumed under the duty of loyalty." 108 Briefl y, we make several points about these ill-advised suggestions for doctrinal change. First, as noted above, most wrongdoing by offi cers will be handled internally by the board, whether rooted in a care or loyalty breach. Judges will make relatively few rulings on offi cers but these rulings are essential to exposit the law and, occasionally at least, expose to public scrutiny (and judicial comment) egregious misbehavior. Second, for liability purposes the gross negligence standard for directors already has been interpreted, in essence, as reckless indifference. 109 The duty of care for directors gives wide berth but it remains analytically distinct from the duty of loyalty. Third, the duty of care for both directors and offi cers remains meaningful for injunctive relief purposes, and should remain so by not watering it down further. Fourth, as a standard of conduct the duty of care is not merely an ex post liability rule; it is also designed to have an ex ante effect on deterring misconduct and guiding behavior for directors and offi cers. To eviscerate it is to remove this salutary benefi t. Fifth, the process/substance distinction is foundational to judicial review of care. It represents the basic fi rebreak between a fi duciary dutyi.e., care-and the business judgment doctrine-i.e., that courts do not, in the care setting at least, make substantive business decisions. Attention to process is something courts are institutionally equipped to address, unlike second-guessing substantive business judgments. Moreover, emphasizing sound process in corporate decision making is grounded in the widespread belief in our legal system (think due process here) that we are more likely to get better substantive outcomes if the appropriate decision maker is accountable for how it makes a decision even if it is not accountable for what the decision is. Surely, fl ipping a coin is no way to decide whether or not to pursue a merger, for example, or whether a criminal defendant should be jailed, even if in retrospect the "right" decision was made. Mr. Graf would scrap that rationale in his quite radical proposal to expunge the duty of care from corporate law, even though it is already somewhat frail for directors.
Our position, specifi cally for offi cers, would seek to preserve the key process/ substance distinction in the judicial review of due care. Courts should not secondguess substantive business judgments of offi cers but they should-in what we believe will be those relatively rare cases reaching courts-examine process, bearing in mind the overall context in which a decision was made. Moreover, offi cers, like all agents, should be expected to act reasonably, not better and not worse. This seems to us especially important at a time of widespread disenchantment with the behavior of many corporate executives, both within and outside the corporate world. The simple aim is to preserve the ex ante power of due care to shape conduct and the ex post capacity to sanction misconduct. In addition, although we believe the default standard of care for offi cers is now and should remain ordinary, "normally exercised" care, we believe too that corporations, via their boards, should be able to alter that standard by contract in specifi c cases. We would permit relaxing the standard to a gross negligence standard but no further, 110 recognizing we have little guidance as to whether, or how far, courts will permit contractual modifi cation of offi cer duties. We believe as well that this should not be done categorically for all offi cers in the certifi cate of incorporation or bylaws, but only on while retaining for offi cers a somewhat stricter default rule. We do not believe Delaware courts would sustain contractual restrictions on monetary liability, in light of the General Assembly' s decision in section 102(b)(7) to permit exculpation only for directors.
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A fi nal point about the relationship between the fi duciary duties of directors and offi cers-and judicial review of those duties-is one that is often overlooked. Currently, the duty of loyalty for directors seems quite close to, if not identical with, the duty of loyalty owed by agents. 113 This outcome evolved haltingly, after a period of time when classic self-dealing transactions by directors potentially were voidable.
114 Now, the duty of loyalty in corporate law takes director confl icts quite seriously, as does agency law, which seems to have infl uenced the law of director loyalty. Consequently, it is on the care front that director duties deviate from those of agency law. Bearing this in mind, the issue is not whether, generally, the fi duciary duties of directors and offi cers are or should be the same. In the loyalty area, they probably are the same and they are, essentially, the same as those of agents, even though directors are not agents. The issue, rather, is the narrower one of whether the duty of care for offi cers, who are agents, should similarly remain that applicable to agents generally or whether a convincing case can be made that, as with directors, only a looser standard of care should be demanded of offi cers. We should be clear, in other words, that the question of equivalent or divergent fi duciary standards for offi cers and directors is a live issue only with respect to the duty of care, although there are several dimensions to that issue.
115

VII. LAW MUST ADDRESS OFFICER CONDUCT; DELAWARE AND/OR THE FEDS?
D elaware law on corporate offi cers remains surprisingly undeveloped. It is true, as noted in Part IV, that it is to be expected that there will be fewer cases . Jones cites positive law limits on director discretion in negotiating offi cer employment agreements and present case law to conclude that directors may be prohibited from agreeing to limit the fi duciary duty obligations of an offi cer beyond the standards of liability for a director. Jones also concludes that any such exculpatory agreements with an offi cer cannot condone any payments or limitation of liability for bad faith misconduct by the offi cer.
111 brought (and adjudicated) against offi cers than against directors. But the lower number of cases does not itself explain why the law of offi cer fi duciary duties has not been, in those cases that were brought, articulated more fully. Gantler was decided only two years ago, and it left open several important issues. 116 With its jurisdiction statute now reaching offi cers, 117 it appears that Delaware judges are inviting the bar to help them address and resolve these open questions. 118 Although we expect there will continue to be far fewer reported cases involving offi cers than directors due to intra-corporate resolutions for the former, judicial articulation of the law still matters, both for the cases that do proceed (in and out of Delaware courts) and to permit counsel to advise offi cers about legal standards concerning their conduct ex ante. Consequently, this is an opportunity for Delaware to write law on a less cluttered, if not blank, legal slate. 119 This is why, although we quite pointedly disagree with him, we welcome Mr. Graf' s voice to the state law conversation. Judges, lawyers (litigators and planners), and corporate law scholars should continue to enrich this discussion. Corporate offi cers are too central to corporate governance to simply unthinkingly "default" their duties to those of corporate directors, as opposed to developing more affi rmative bases for why offi cer duties should be the same as or, as we believe, different from, those of directors.
In the meantime, the non-criminal sanctioning of offi cers may be taking place in federal bankruptcy courts with respect to fi duciary duties and, more generally, by the SEC. The SEC has a broad arsenal of sanctions it can bring to bear against offi cer misconduct, including civil monetary penalties, 120 cease and desist orders, 121 and barring wrongdoers from further service as an offi cer or director of a reporting company. 122 Financial fraud cases by the SEC are usually brought against the company and its offi cers. 123 Few cases are brought against directors, 124 though recently that agency has targeted certain outside directors in two actions. 125 This is the mirror opposite of litigation under Delaware corporate law, where there are numerous cases against directors and far fewer against offi cers.
126 Many SEC cases brought against offi cers concern the usual fare of intentional fi nancial fraud, at least at the charging stage. 127 Frequently, however, it appears that many cases are resolved on negligence grounds, for example, under sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, rather than on scienter-based counts.
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In 2010, to illustrate, in separate actions against Dell Computer Corp. and several of its offi cers and against Citigroup, the SEC obtained consent decrees under such a negligent fraud theory.
129 One commentator recently has described these initiatives as the SEC' s effort to develop a federal " Caremark duty" to monitor under the federal securities laws, generally aimed at offi cers. 130 The SEC also has targeted related party transactions and has used the clawback provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to "claw back" incentive compensation, even where the offi cer was not involved in the underlying fraud. 131 The point here is not to assess the merits or demerits of the SEC' s strategy. The point simply is that the current legal action against corporate offi cers is at the federal level, not the state level. This is a less noticed version of the creeping "federalization" of corporate lawmaking than that seen in the corporate law-related provisions of the landmark Dodd-Frank legislation. 132 This has resulted not from express disenchantment with state corporate law as such, but from that body of law' s sustained and outright neglect of offi cer conduct. Even though they see fewer offi cer cases than director cases, we do agree with Mr. Graf that it is "simply a matter of time" before Delaware courts must resolve the open issues associated with offi cer wrongdoing. 133 When they do so, we hope they craft the law of offi cer duties in a way that, while realistic, also provides meaningful accountability along the lines advocated here and in earlier work.
